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Abstract: Codes of conduct seek to institutionalize certain practices and govern the 
actions of those who accept the regime. As they arise and seek to displace established 
ways of life in organizations, they provide examples of institutional development and 
change. Th is paper examines how the UK code of corporate governance arose and de-
veloped over time, and how it leads to a common understanding across various fi elds 
of social actors. Specifi cally, it examines the debate about what the ethos of the board 
for directors should be, as exhibited in consultations informing the 1992, 2003 and 
2010 versions of the code. It shows social actors, as expected, taking stances aligned 
with their economic interests. But over time and through the institutional work in-
volved in the debate, some of those actors identify increasingly with the process, and 
the collective understanding informs the identity of those participants. 
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Introduction
In corporate governance, and in many countries around the world, codes have 
become the mechanism through which boards and to some extent investors 
have organized their work. Companies, investors, regulators and states alike 
have come to the view that the internal direction-setting and control of cor-
porations is too complex and particular to be the subject of detailed legislation 
or regulation. But corporate misdemeanours and malfeasance have been too 
prevalent and costly to leave to individual decision-making. Th e preferred so-
lution in many places has been to turn to binding-yet-voluntary codes. 
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Codes of conduct exist within companies and industries and across coun-
tries and multilateral organizations, with increasingly widespread use (Paine, 
Deshpandé, Margolis, & Bettcher, 2005; Seidl, 2007). Th ey guide the actions 
of individuals and organizations without the force or the infl exibility of law 
but also without political cost (O’Rourke, 2003). Th ey seek followers through 
demonstrating the legitimacy of their recommendations, and gain legitimacy 
by the followers they collect. Codes have institutional characteristics, but they 
are not automatically institutions. 
Th e aim of this paper is to explore the processes through which one such 
proto-institution (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Zietsma & McKnight, 
2009), the UK code of corporate governance, gains adherents and confers le-
gitimacy on those who adopt it through the institutional work (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006) involved in its development. Starting with the Cadbury Code 
in 1992 and the continuing revisions to the current UK Corporate Governance 
Code of 2016, corporate governance practices have become institutionalized. 
In so doing, it seeks to observe how institutional work in writing a code of 
conduct contributes to identifi cation with the code and begins to embed its 
values in those aff ected. 
Moreover, the UK code has served as a model for code development in 
other countries, including France and Germany, Russia and Japan. It has also 
infl uenced thinking from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 1999, 2004), and the World Bank (IFC, 2005, 2007) 
in developing guidelines for corporations arising in transition economies 
of central and eastern Europe and the developing world in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009). However, the sim-
ilarities of code around the world may be somewhat uncomfortably given 
the varieties for formal institutions in law and regulations, that is, the va-
rieties of capitalism practices under diff ering institutional settings (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001).
Over the past 25 years, the content of the UK’s code has shown considerable 
continuity, despite recurring shocks. But they have seen a shift  in emphasis. 
Th e discourse of board eff ectiveness has moved from structure in Cadbury, to 
independence in the 2003 version, to recognition in 2010 of the importance 
of behaviour, particularly in supportive yet challenging relationships between 
directors (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). In so doing, it has refl ected the tenu-
ous links between either code-based governance structures and metrics of 
independence on the one hand and performance on the other (Love, 2011). 
Moreover, it resonates with growing interest in the concept of behavioural 
governance (Marnet, 2007; van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009; Vandewaerde, 
Voordeckers, Lambrechts, & Bammens, 2011). 
In the formulation and evolution of the code, what processes – involving 
which actors, arguments and actions – allowed this code to become institution-
alized and then led to this change of discourse? Th e consultations considered 
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issues of board design and composition, tenure of directors, board evaluation 
processes, and the nature of enforcement and compliance, but one question 
linked several of the debates: What is the right ethos for the boardroom? Ethos 
goes to the heart of the question of behaviour. 
Th is paper considers briefl y in Section 1 the literature on board eff ectiveness 
and then in Section 2 describes development of the fi rst code in 1992 and major 
revisions of 2003 and 2010. Section 3 outlines institutional theory, institutional 
work, and identity work in particular. Section 4 comments on methodology, 
while Section 5 examines the contributions to the debate of boardroom ethos 
and behaviour from 1992 to 2010 to assess the actors from diff erent fi elds, their 
fi eld-based interests and identities, and nature of work they undertook. Section 
6 discusses these fi nding in light of the complex interaction of institutional 
work, through which participants take on an emergent identity associated with 
corporate governance and the processes of codifi cation. Th e paper then con-
cludes with a brief summary and points to unanswered questions and future 
research. In so doing it contributes to our understanding of the development 
of the UK code and codes in other countries that use it as their benchmark. 
It also shows how the process of identifi cation through institutional work can 
facilitate institutionalization in a contested fi eld. 
1. Board eff ectiveness 
A central aim of the code in all its versions is to enhance board eff ectiveness, 
oft en described as involving opposing functions of service and control (Aguilera, 
2005; Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009). 
Th e code seeks to do so through recommendations about board structure (e.g. 
separating the role of chairman and CEO; specifying the number of independ-
ent directors), norms (e.g. defi ning independence; prescribing fi nancial exper-
tise on audit committees) and processes (e.g. mandating disclosure; enforcing 
compliance). 
Codes add a structural component to the processes of board eff ectiveness 
identifi ed by Forbes and Milliken (1999), with its elements of board mem-
ber characteristics that interact with eff ort norms and the use of knowledge 
and skills and operate through cognitive confl ict. But the code recognizes, 
and with particular emphasis in 2010 and its deliberate change in tone (FRC, 
2010, Preface, Paragraph 6), a more elusive quality related to how directors act 
towards each other and with respect to shareholders. Th is emphasis refl ects 
the need for cohesiveness in a board, which Forbes and Milliken (1999) see 
in a tense relationship with cognitive confl ict. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005, p. S6) endorse a similar need in suggesting outside directors be “en-
gaged but non-executive”, “challenging but supportive” and “independent 
but involved”.
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2. Code development
Th e three main versions of the code arose in similar circumstances: Corporate 
failures provided a precipitating jolt (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) 
that placed the legitimacy of current arrangements in doubt. While the jolts 
had similarities, the processes of codifi cation diff ered in detail. 
2.1. Process in 1991-92
Th e Cadbury Code emerged aft er 18 months of discussion and debate. Th e 
Financial Reporting Council and the London Stock Exchange asked Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, scion of a Quaker family of industrialists, to lead an inquiry starting in 
May 1991. Both organizations were, at the time, industry self-regulatory bodies 
overseeing the accounting and audit professions (FRC) and the equity markets 
(LSE and its UK Listing Authority); the initiative was largely a private-sector aff air. 
Although a private-sector initiative, the work had public backing. With sup-
port of staff  seconded by the Bank of England and the Department of Trade 
and Industry, Sir Adrian empanelled a committee drawn from industry, the 
fi nancial community and the accounting profession. Th ey interviewed dozens 
of people, received contributions by post and fax, and attended public meet-
ings. In May 1992 the committee produced a draft  code and discussion pa-
per and then undertook a formal consultation before publishing the code in 
December 1992. Many of the documents from that inquiry are digitized and 
available online (Cadbury Archive, 2010) and are drawn from more than 200 
from before the draft  text was issued in May 1992 and almost as many in re-
sponse to the July draft . 
2.2. Process in 2002-03
Government took the lead in response to the crisis at Enron and other com-
panies in the opening years of the 2000s. It commissioned three studies on 
corporate governance: Th e Higgs Review (2003) on the eff ectiveness of non-
executive directors, the Smith Review (2003) on audit, and the Tyson Report 
(2003) on widening the pool of directors. Th e centrality of Higgs to the revi-
sion of the Combined Code that July means we focus here on responses to it. 
Higgs commissioned three research studies: a statistical analysis of board 
composition; a survey profi ling more than 600 directors (MORI, 2002); and 
research involving in-depth interviews with 40 corporate chairmen and direc-
tors (McNulty, Roberts, & Stiles, 2003). Th e review proved controversial. Th e 
FRC chairman later recalled the “media noise level and the hostility… by com-
pany Chairmen” (Nicholson, 2008, p. 110). What the FRC, now a government-
directed agency, had intended as a quick, “fatal fl aws only” review received 
more than 180 responses (FRC, 2004). In addition, public and private gather-
ings discussed the implications for companies, and institutional shareholders.
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2.3. Process in 2009-10
Despite the Higgs controversy, recommended practices were widely adopted and 
further revisions in 2006 and 2008 made only modest changes. But the fi nancial 
crisis led to the collapse of one UK bank in 2007; the near-global meltdown forced 
part-nationalization of two more large British banks in 2008. Th e consequences 
were two-fold: First, the government commissioned an inquiry into the corporate 
governance at fi nancial institutions (Walker, 2009a, 2009b). Second and rough-
ly in parallel, the FRC pulled forward its review of the Combined Code by one 
year. For the former, the investment banker Sir David Walker undertook a two-
stage consultation. His draft  appeared in July and the fi nal report in November. 
While Walker focused only on fi nancial fi rms, the Combined Code had 
broader application. Th e FRC conducted a  three-stage consultation coordi-
nated by its chairman, Sir Christopher Hogg. First came an open consultation 
about what had worked well and less well in the Combined Code. Th e second 
sought views on whether the July draft  of Walker’s recommendations for fi -
nancial institutions applied to the wider fi eld of corporations. Th e third sought 
comments on a new draft  text, published a week aft er the fi nal Walker Review. 
Each phase also prompted public and private meetings. 
Th e FRC received more than 100 written submissions to each consultation. 
Some individuals and groups felt that corporate governance had taken a wrong 
turn – in one direction or another – and wanted to steer the code towards a dif-
ferent goal. For others, the code had become symbolic of what they valued in 
corporate governance, something to be defended against those who would di-
lute its aims or tighten its constraints. 
Contributions to consultations shared a purpose: development of a common 
understanding of good corporate governance. Many participants had another aim: 
the avoidance of legislative or regulatory action to constrain boards. Th e crisis 
that led to the Cadbury Report probably meant the change was inevitable. New 
institutional arrangements would supplant undefi ned arrangements copied in-
formally between boards, that is, mimetic isomorphism gives way to the norma-
tive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Some participants wanted to go further, enact-
ing binding rules and coercing compliance. Th ese voices, as well as the actions of 
the authors of the code version, may be viewed as engaging in institutional work. 
3. Institutions, work and identity
Institutions persist over time, and yet they change. Th is paradox of embedded 
agency (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002) has stimulated much work in institu-
tional theory as it seeks to overcome objections that it is only a partial theory 
(Clegg, 2010; Kraatz, 2011). In seeking to understand how this paradox is re-
solved, theorists have turned to a variety of explanations.
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3.1. Institutional work
DiMaggio (1988) introduced the term institutional entrepreneurship to explain 
how actors use ideas from outside to dislodge incumbent practices and create 
opportunities for change. Oliver (1992, p. 564) argues that deinstitutionaliza-
tion represents “the de-legitimation of an established organizational practice 
or procedure” in response to challenges facing the organization or the failure 
of organizations to perform as expected. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) see 
dissatisfaction with a changing market context and discrepancies between the 
values of actors and institutional arrangements as antecedents of institutional 
change. But what starts the process? Greenwood and colleagues (2002) theorize 
that a precipitating jolt from changes in the environment would make embed-
ded actors perceive the inadequacy of current arrangements. 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) see institutional change as coming from 
elites who recognize the contradictions in the institutional fi eld and initiate 
change. But Rao and Giorgi (2006) contend that actors on the periphery of 
a social system can eff ect change as well. Th ese depictions suggest that change 
arises from the choices initiated by actors but largely in response to environ-
mental issues that undermine the institution’s legitimacy. 
Extending the entrepreneurship concept, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 
215) introduce the term institutional work to encompass “purposive action 
of individuals or organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutions”. Work is intentional, not simply routinized behaviour, the eff ort 
of agency rather than the product of structure. Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 
(2011, p. 56) argue that concept of institutional work provides a “bridge” be-
tween critical and institutional views of organizations by focusing on actors, 
their intentions and hidden voices. 
Institutional work depends on agency, which may vary over time. Emirbayer 
and Mische (1998, p. 1012) assert that actors “are always living simultaneously 
in the past, future, and present”. Th ey identify three types of agency: a back-
ward-oriented approach they call iterative; the present-oriented, practical-
evaluative type; and a forward-looking form they call projective. Battilana and 
D’Aunno (2009) use these categories to elaborate institutional work, setting 
them against categories of actions in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) involved 
in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. Iterative agency involves 
repeated steps to emphasize persistence; the practical-evaluative type demon-
strates the (in)effi  cacy of the logics they support or wish to disrupt; projective 
agency involves imagining a diff erent future state. Th e 20 types of institutional 
work they articulate overlap with the 18 in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006). It 
also off ers some new forms of work, including two they see as work involved 
in creating institutions in present-oriented, practical-evaluative agency. Actors 
interpret institutional arrangements (translation) or assemble elements from 
diff erent mechanisms (bricolage) to fi t particular settings. As we shall see, both 
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have resonances in the way individual companies respond to corporate govern-
ance arrangements under a comply-or-explain regime involving internation-
ally active actors. Moreover, translation suggests that ideas oft en do not diff use 
intact through a fi eld but instead are interpreted as they pass from one actor to 
another (Czarniawska, 2007; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996).
3.2. Identity work in institutional theory
Institutional work can take the form of individuals identifying with the institu-
tion or with alternative arrangements. Creed, Dejordy, and Lok (2010, p. 1337) 
describe the “identity work” of marginalized actors through a process that can 
be both “conservative and disruptive”. Th is depiction suggests that institutional 
work need not sit fi rmly within the categories of “creating”, “maintaining” or 
“disrupting” identifi ed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006). In a study related to 
the present paper, Lok (2010) found that both investors and corporate manag-
ers invoked confl icting logics, diff ering identities and contrasting associated 
practices in their approach to corporate governance, and suggested that these 
contradictions can persist over long periods. He notes that “self-identity can 
continue to be fractured and inconsistent, invoking diff erent contradictory 
practices under diff erent circumstances and at diff erent times” (Lok, 2010, p. 
1326). Th e intentionality of institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) 
combined with considerations of identity suggest the nature of institutional 
work may be dependent on the interpretation actors give to aspects of the in-
stitution and its logic. With this background in mind we look at what institu-
tional work happened during the consultations about UK corporate govern-
ance, following a description of the methodology used. 
Bévort and Suddaby (2016) see identity work in the way accountants coped 
with shift ing institutional logics as fi rms grew more managerial and a profi t-
corporate logic clashed with the professional, client-oriented one that had long 
informed accountancy training and practice. Unlike many previous studies of 
identity and institutional work, theirs focuses on the processes of identifi ca-
tion of individuals, rather than organizations. Th e study urges scholars to pay 
closer attention to individuals as social actors in seeking to establish the pro-
cesses of institutionalization and institutional change. Th e present study seeks 
to do that by attending to both organizational and personal contributions to 
the debate over the nature of corporate boards. 
4. Methodology
To examine institutional work and identifi cation, this paper uses evidence from 
the consultations that led to the creation of the UK corporate governance code 
in 1992, following a series of corporate governance failures. It then examines 
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those ongoing consultations for the major modifi cations undertaken as fresh 
crises in corporate governance struck, in the early 2000s and then in response 
to the fi nancial crisis later in that decade. 
Analysis involved an iterative reading of submissions to the debates concern-
ing the three code versions, paying close attention to language and argument. 
Discourse analysis developed from a more general study of themes that arise 
from texts into specialized disciplines using techniques drawn from fi elds as 
disparate as linguistics, literary theory, critical theory in politics and sociology 
and psychology (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Chia, 2000). While some stud-
ies explore these approaches in isolation to determine their methodological 
signifi cance, this paper seeks to interpret texts. It requires, therefore, that we 
look at various aspects of language, including diction, word order, metaphor, 
stated and unstated allusions, as well as the use of forceful rhetoric to identify 
meanings and assumptions. 
Th e documents necessarily present an incomplete view, but they provide 
opportunity to explore the arguments and rhetoric of offi  cials of listed com-
panies, fi nancial institutions, their advisers and the general public. Formal re-
sponses may lack the spontaneity and vibrant language of face-to-face com-
munications. Nonetheless, the submissions represent a considered distillation 
of views, ones that a committee or a thoughtful author would give weight to 
in setting policy. Th ere is evidence of this in the data, in particular in the sum-
maries in the Cadbury Archive, which interpret those submissions to guide 
committee members’ thinking. 
Work began by reading a  large proportion of the available documents. 
Because of the volume of the data, detailed analysis was undertaken on a sam-
ple of papers and a subset of the issues. Th is study used theoretical sampling 
based on two criteria: First, following Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) and 
Rao and Giorgi (2006), was the position of actors in the fi eld, in this case the 
investment supply chain. Second, was the salience of issues (Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997), which led to consideration of topics based on the controversy 
they aroused. 
Th e documents were coded in Nvivo soft ware into categories including con-
cepts such as chairman, institutional investors, and then higher level ones such 
as compliance, structure, independence and behaviour. As new ideas came to 
the fore, additional coding was applied for emerging categories, and then the 
papers were read again to identify axial dimensions (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998), in this case drawing on the literature of board eff ectiveness. Of 
relevance to the analysis below, axial coding refl ected the apparent tension in 
the data between industry expertise and independence and its eff ect on board-
room challenge and cohesiveness. Th e texts were then read against categories of 
institutional work developed from perspectives in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
and Battilana and D’Aunno (2009). Th e data-coding presented numerous op-
portunities to read and re-read the source material, in its entirety and as coded. 
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Although the initial reading for this study ranged widely in the documenta-
tion, analysis concentrated on contributions made during public consultations: 
1) aft er the Cadbury Committee had issued its draft  in July 1992 and before the 
fi nal code in December; 2) aft er publication of the Higgs Review in January 
2003 and before the July publication of the Combined Code; and 3) all three 
consultation phases concerning the 2010 code. 
5. Findings
Th e three versions of the code show concern about issues aff ecting mainly struc-
ture, independence and behaviour, with a changing emphasis over time (Nordberg 
& McNulty, 2013). Th e consultations gathered views from a wide spectrum of 
actors. At the centre of the corporate governance debate were senior corporate 
offi  cers, and representatives of investment fi rms and trade associations. At one 
step removed were professional advisors and importantly the accountancy pro-
fession. More peripheral actors came from public interest organizations, po-
litical actors, and those focused on non-shareholder interests. But contributors 
from across the spectrum viewed these themes as interlocking: For example, 
structures such as board committees empower non-executive directors at the 
expense of executives, thus contributing to board independence and potentially 
infl uencing behaviour. 
Th e three rounds of consultations considered issues including the separation 
of the roles of chairman and CEO (1992 only; participants took that for granted 
during subsequent revisions); creating a senior independent director (1992), 
giving that person a specifi c duties with investors (2003), and then suggesting 
diff erent behavioural expectations of the role (2010); the creation of commit-
tees (1992), which were then placed under the control of independent directors 
(2003); limiting the tenure of non-executives’ deemed independence (2003 and 
2010); frequency of director elections (all three versions); giving non-execu-
tives the right to hire external professional advice (1992 only). In both 2003 
and 2010 controversy arose about whether, when and how to conduct board 
evaluation. Arguments on one side over structure or procedure focused on how 
to strengthen board independence to induce challenge, expanding the board’s 
ability to exercise its “control” function. Th e arguments on the other focused 
on how these measures would prove divisive, pitting directors against each 
other and splitting the board between executive and non-executive members. 
Contributors in each time period evoked a theme concerning the nature of 
accountability. On one side we hear voices emphasizing the need for board-
room challenge, which would constrain managerial discretion; on the other – 
and particularly though not exclusively from corporate actors – come those 
seeking collegiality and contributions to strategy. Taken together they concern 
the ethos of the boardroom. 
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Boardroom ethos
How directors behave – that is, behaviour within boards and between boards 
and shareholders – has been an important concern of the code since its incep-
tion, but one where the codes’ authors have accepted that a code could have little 
direct impact. As a result, the code has sought to deal with behavioural issues by 
proxy. Structures and procedures seek to limit the discretion of the board and, 
thus, the range of possible behaviour. Independence of mind aims to encourage 
constructive boardroom challenge; lacking a mechanism to ensure it, the code 
settles for defi nitions of independence. Some provisions, including controversial 
ones like board evaluation, may prescribe activities of the board in the hope they 
will lead to changes in behaviour. With the fi nancial crisis of 2007–09, however, 
came stronger acknowledgement that these proxy approaches were insuffi  cient. 
Board ethos in the Cadbury debate. Documents in the Cadbury Archive show 
the committee’s concern that the code might miss the target. A hint comes 
from the chairman’s document (CAD-01265; NB: references with the prefi x 
CAD- refer to the document number in the Cadbury Archive at the University 
of Cambridge) prepared for the committee as it reviewed all the responses to 
its May 1992 draft  report in September, when the committee would agree the 
thrust and some detail for fi nal report. A note in an appendix called “Table of 
Points for Discussion” includes item 12 on “Th e Board”, where the note-writ-
er, in what appears to be Sir Adrian’s handwriting, writes: “More emphasis on 
behaviour needed, less on structure?” 
Th at question does not appear in any document off ered for the committee’s 
deliberations, but several of the changes agreed that day came in response to 
concerns about excessive prescription and the “tone” of the draft  report, mat-
ters that link structure and behaviour. Th is debate suggests recognition by the 
committee of the tension between structure and agency in achieving board 
eff ectiveness. In his submission to the committee, Richard Lloyd, the Vickers 
chairman, put it this way: 
[…] your Report perhaps should pay more heed in your fi nal version to certain 
behavioural aspects which are, in our view, central to a Board’s eff ectiveness […] 
most U.K. Boards, anyway those of medium-size companies, are probably more 
intimately involved in the knowledge, understanding and direction of the business 
than is the case with counterparts across the Atlantic (CAD-01357).
Th ese “behavioural aspects” echo the need for the “presence” and “use” of 
knowledge and skills in the Forbes and Milliken (1999) model of board eff ec-
tiveness. Lloyd links them to the “genuinely unitary” nature of UK boards, as 
opposed to the more supervisory approach in the US. Paul Girolami, Glaxo’s 
chairman, worried that the draft  cast non-executives as “watchdogs or guard-
ians” of interests of shareholder interests or even those of “the public”: 
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We do not see this as the only – or even primary – role of the non-executive direc-
tors. Th ey bring to the boardroom independence and outside experience which 
cannot be provided by the executive directors, and those qualities are (or ought 
to be) deployed to enhance the general decision-making of the Board on all the 
aspects of corporate aff airs with which it has to deal. Th e constructive harnessing 
of this spectrum of experience requires the creation of a team ethos (CAD-02105).
Th e equine metaphor of “constructive harnessing”, coupled with the elec-
tromagnetic and colourful metaphor in “spectrum”, invokes images the sense 
of abundant and unruly force channelled to good purpose. Th e use of “team 
ethos” is valorized as a “creation”. 
Th e self-described “professional chairman” J.B.H. Jackson put “a lot of eff ort 
into keeping boards united and am nervous of external interventions which 
could run against this”; he was “particularly nervous of cultivating the notion 
that the standards of behaviour anticipated by ‘the City’ diff er between execu-
tive and non-executive directors” (CAD-02143). Here “the City” – the fi nan-
ciers in the City of London – is a distant, alien force seeking to divide those 
“united” on the board. 
Stanley Kalms, chairman of Dixons, wrote about the “unique cultures” of 
companies as justifying the assertion that there was “little benefi t in absolute 
uniformity for its own sake” and warning against a code that “did not recog-
nise individuality” (CAD-02167). Sir Richard Greenbury, chairman of Marks & 
Spencer, said companies “must act as a cohesive unit”; the context makes clear 
this refers in particular to boards. Moreover, “whatever Code or Regulation 
may be in place, the issue [of boardroom power] will be decided by the mix of 
personalities” (CAD-02343).
Th ese comments emphasize simultaneously the singularity of companies 
and the unity boards. Th ey perceive a  threat in a one-size-fi ts-all code; the 
individuality of personalities within the boardroom contributes to the unity 
of the unitary board. Th e purpose that this unity-in-individuality served was 
expressed by the Confederation of British Industry in arguing that the draft  
[…] understates the contribution which the non-executives can make to the growth 
of a business: their diff erent experience brings a fresh eye to problems and the 
development of strategy (CAD-02349).
Non-executives contribute scarce resources (“experience”, “a  fresh eye”) 
for the sake of developing strategy and promoting growth. Th ese views paint 
a picture in which the board is an exciting place to be, a place where structures 
enable more than they constrain, a place alive with contradictions and uncer-
tainties, and a place the draft  code threatened to disrupt.
Such considerations are largely absent from submissions by investors, their 
advisors and accountancy fi rms. One of the few investors that remarked on 
it was Legal & General. It welcomed the draft ’s formal defi nition of diff ering 
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roles for executives and non-executives but put emphasis not on the control 
function of non-executives but their service: “balance is provided between ex-
ecutive responsibility for day to day management and non-executive strategic 
input” (CAD-02353). Th e investment company 3i went further, noting that it 
was worried that the draft  wanted non-executives to act as “corporate police-
man” when they were needed to contribute to policy development. It installed 
directors on the companies in which it invested “to benefi t the business not to 
police our investment” (CAD-02387). It is worth noting that L&G and 3i were 
themselves major listed companies as well as important investors.
Board ethos in the post-Higgs debate. Th e Higgs Review of the eff ectiveness 
of non-executive directors sought to emphasize the importance of behaviour 
for the eff ectiveness of boards. In the body of his report, Higgs added: “Th e 
key to non-executive director eff ectiveness lies as much in behaviours and re-
lationships as in structures and processes” (2003, Paragraph 6.3), before out-
lining the “behaviours and personal attributes” of non-executives (Paragraphs 
6.9–6.19). He also provided guidance on the behaviour of eff ective chairmen 
in an annex. He used “behaviour” and “behaviours” almost interchangeably, 
leaving readers to interpret to what extent they mean the general depiction of 
the interaction of directors or observable phenomena. Respondents, particu-
larly but not exclusively from corporations, worried that proposed prescrip-
tions would require specifi c behaviours, leading to divisions within a unitary 
board and harming performance, rather than fostering trust. We look next at 
a specifi c case of their impact: the role of the senior independent director, or 
SID, and how it would divide the board.
Higgs recommended that the SID have a direct relationship with investors. 
Other non-executive directors meet investors, too, but they should “rely on the 
chairman and the senior independent director to ensure a balanced view is tak-
en” (Higgs, 2003, Paragraph 15.16). Th e SID, by contrast, “should attend suffi  -
cient of the regular meetings of management with a range of major sharehold-
ers to develop a balanced understanding of the themes, issues and concerns of 
shareholders” (2003, Paragraph 15.15). Moreover, Higgs proposed the SID be 
available to shareholders “if they have reason for concern that contact through 
the normal channels of chairman or chief executive has failed to resolve” (2003, 
Paragraph 7.5). To many respondents, and especially company chairmen, this 
challenged the authority of the chairman. Th e CBI responded in these terms: 
Business is concerned that the proposed Code inadvertently undermines the role 
of the chairman of a company. It is in no one’s interests that this happens (CBI, 
16 April 2003, Paragraph 10).
We are also very concerned about the proposed role of the senior independent di-
rector. Business believes that this could inadvertently create three separate forces 
in a board whereas boards need to be a united force. Th e Cadbury Report iden-
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tifi ed the danger of a CEO dominating the board. What the Report says on the 
senior independent director actually does increase the potential risk of a CEO 
playing off  the senior independent against the chairman and thereby weaken-
ing the chairman. Th is very much undermines the Cadbury philosophy (CBI, 16 
April 2003, Paragraph 12).
Here the trade association seeks to assert authority by identifying its view 
with that of “Business”, claiming through a totum pro parte authority beyond 
the scope of its (already powerful) membership. Th at the “undermining” is 
“inadvertent” seeks to prevent damage without provoking retaliation. By sug-
gesting Higgs might undermine the aims of Cadbury and thus strengthen the 
hand of the chief executive, the CBI attacks Higgs by invoking the very logic 
of his review. 
Baroness Hogg, chairman of the listed private equity group 3i and one of 
the very few women respondents, said Higgs did “not suffi  ciently distinguish 
between the ‘backstop’ role of the Senior Independent Director, and the day-
to-day responsibilities of the Chairman” (2 April 2003). Th is is language that 
defends (“backstop”) and thus maintains the status quo and her own role, while 
seeking to disrupt the changes Higgs planned. Lord Weir, chairman of the con-
struction group Balfour Beatty, argued that the “promotion” of the SID would 
“undermine the role of the Chairman”. His company had not seen the need to 
follow Cadbury’s guidance on designated a senior non-executive in view of 
the independence of the chairman. Martin Broughton, chairman of BAT, said 
investors “rarely avail themselves” of the existing opportunity for contact with 
other directors. Moreover, he called another of the Higgs recommendations – 
that the chairman not chair the nominations committee or even sit on the au-
dit and remuneration committees – “constitutionally unsound”. 
Th ese and other expressions of concern from the corporate side might be 
seen as chairmen protecting their own positions. But their reasoning invokes 
corporate benefi t arising from trust and collegial behaviour. Moreover, similar 
sentiments appear in submissions from mainstream investors and their rep-
resentatives, though in less forceful language. It was a shared issue, if perhaps 
with diff erent salience to these two core groups.
Board ethos in the post-fi nancial crisis debate. As the debate got underway 
in 2009, the Association of British Insurers called attention to relatively new 
terminology in the fi eld: behavioural governance. Th e ABI’s fi rst submission 
urged the code-writers to recognize that how people relate is more important 
than compliance. It did so by drawing a distinction between substance and form: 
In our view the Code, which represents form, can only be eff ective if the subjects 
(in most cases the non-executives) apply its principles properly, thereby creating the 
substance. Th is application may be termed behavioural governance. Behavioural 
governance will be aff ected by such attributes as skills and experience of the in-
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dividuals, but the two most important attributes a non-executive must have is 
personal integrity and good judgement. Th e ABI recognises that it is highly dif-
fi cult to demonstrate such attributes through a Code, we therefore believe that 
the most eff ective way to assess this is through interaction and dialogue between 
non-executives and investors (ABI, May 2009, pp. 2–3).
Th e value descriptors here are “integrity” and “judgement” not compliance. 
Th e mechanisms are “interaction” and “dialogue”, though crucially these terms 
refer to the relationship between directors and investors, placing emphasis on 
hierarchical accountability rather than mutuality and trust in the boardroom. 
It acknowledges shareholder primacy while also seeking to move directors’ ac-
tions away from narrow compliance. 
Th e ABI’s submission returned to the theme two pages later when discuss-
ing risk management: 
Th e ability to understand the risks includes an element of judgement. Th is there-
fore is an aspect of behavioural governance that investors, as outsiders, will al-
ways to a degree struggle to fully grasp. One method of addressing this is to look 
to “expert” directors to provide comfort. However, whilst we support the concept 
of a fi nancial expert on an Audit Committee and relevant expertise being present 
on the board, we would counsel against over reliance on “experts”. It is our expe-
rience that whilst experts are useful they also have a tendency to be more easily 
“captured” as they will naturally see things in a similar manner to other experts, 
usually management. As important as expert knowledge is, it must be coupled with 
keen skills of critical analysis, the ability to constructively challenge and question 
assumptions. Also, other directors may tend to rely too much on the views of the 
‘expert’ rather than bringing their own judgement to bear (ABI, May 2009, p. 5, 
punctuation inconsistencies in the original).
Th e section is worth quoting at length because, unlike other submissions 
from central actors or its own submissions on other points, the ABI here elab-
orated its argument, rather than relying upon assumed meanings. Much of the 
debate preceding the consultation concerned how independent non-execu-
tives on bank boards had failed to understand risk. One solution, suggested in 
the Walker Review two months later, was greater expertise. But here the ABI, 
a  trade association for risk experts, argued against expertise, and in rather 
forceful terms. Experts were “more easily ‘captured’“, so other directors must 
bring “judgement to bear”. Th e experts themselves must be more than expert; 
they must also have “keen skills of critical analysis”, and then “constructively 
challenge” and “question assumptions”. Th is argument maintains the institu-
tion of the code with its emphasis on independence even as it seeks to push it 
along the path of relying more on behaviour. Th at the language here is much 
more vivid than in much of the rest of its submission suggests that its author(s) 
saw this as a crucial issue. Th e institutional work is moving in two directions, 
disrupting the code’s reliance on structure and independence while maintain-
ing them as well. 
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Other submissions also placed emphasis on behaviour more than compli-
ance. Th e CBI’s fi rst submission spoke of the importance of the more general 
importance of having a “culture of challenge” in the boardroom, arising from 
having a “broad talent pool” of non-executive directors, before adding:
Th e eff ective application of the Code’s principles is largely reliant on the behaviour 
[sic] of individuals and their interactions. Th is is not something that can sensibly 
be legislated for or regulated (CBI, May 2009, p. 2).
In contrast to the ABI submission, this account of behaviour and these 
interactions are internal to the board, not also in relation to shareholders. 
Moreover, neither the code-writers nor government can “sensibly” contrib-
ute much to improve it. Th e CBI’s language affi  rms the code’s value while un-
dermining readings of it the emphasize structure. It denigrates legislation and 
regulation, implicitly also denigrating the more regulatory approaches to the 
code implicit in the compliance mentality other contributors, particularly pe-
ripheral actors, had stressed. 
Th e submission from GC100, an association of corporate counsel from the 
largest companies, made a similar point in suggesting a non-regulatory approach: 
Th e Code will only provide a framework for good governance but will not allevi-
ate the issues caused by bad management within a company. Th ese behavioural 
issues can certainly be infl uenced through a robust board/committee evaluation 
process and possibly through guidance on best practice from the FRC (GC100, 
May 2009, p. 4).
Th is view affi  rms the value of the code even as it challenges it: the code is 
“only” a framework, though the committees it has legitimatized can infl uence 
behaviour through “robust” process of evaluation, thus affi  rming while simul-
taneously questioning the eff ectiveness of code. SABMiller identifi ed with the 
CG100 stance in its submission, before adding: 
If there were governance weaknesses that contributed to the current crisis, it was 
in the application of the Code rather than a lack of prescription within the Code 
itself. Adding extra governance requirements is likely to lead to more box ticking 
and hamper eff ective scrutiny by non executive directors by occupying time with 
form rather than looking at substance. Key to the eff ectiveness of corporate gov-
ernance is the calibre of the individuals involved, and that they have a clear un-
derstanding of their role and responsibilities and the tools necessary to discharge 
their responsibilities eff ectively (SABMiller, May 2009, p. 1).
Th e contrast between “form” and “substance” returns, as do the limitations 
of codes in dealing with behaviour. Articulation of code creates “more box tick-
ing”, one of many uses of the derogatory phrase made in submissions from ac-
tors in central positions. Emphasis is placed instead on the “calibre of the in-
dividuals” with the “necessary” tools. Th at could be read as a request for more 
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tools, had not the passage already warned that extra requirements would “ham-
per eff ective scrutiny” and thus be counterproductive. Th is is language aimed 
at maintaining the code, and the logic of corporate governance as SABMiller 
interprets it, but also to disrupt the plans of others to assert their interpreta-
tion of codes as defi ning acceptable behaviour, not merely providing structures 
within which agents can act. 
As the three consultations progressed, the topic returns from a large number 
of actors. Th e CBI’s October 2009 submission suggested: “Promoting a culture 
of respect, trust and challenge is the most important issue, and ultimately the 
job of the chairman. Th e CBI believes that there is only so far you can codify 
all of this” (p. 3). A few pages later in discussing board evaluation, it added: 
Th e key aspect of board performance is behavioural, and therefore much less ame-
nable to formal “testing”. External evaluation should not be a substitute for open 
debate and robust challenge between the Executive and the NEDs, nor eff ective 
communication and engagement with shareholders (CBI, October 2009, p. 6).
Not all respondents agreed. Th e second submission by Fair Pensions, an 
advisory fi rm to pension funds, responded to the FRC assertion that “Th ere is 
a recognition that the quality of corporate governance ultimately depends on 
behaviour not process” in the following terms: 
Everyone accepts that good governance depends on behaviour and that regula-
tion alone is not enough. Th e practical question, however, is what form of regula-
tion will best promote the required behaviour (Fair Pensions, October 2009, p. 2).
Th e word “however” emphasises the rhetorical change of direction and one 
that invokes a diff erent, regulatory logic of behaviour more akin to agency than 
stewardship theory in corporate governance, emphasizing more the structure in 
an institutional approach to the fi eld than the concept of embedded agency. Th is 
form of institutional work is both maintaining the code and disrupting attempts 
of those in more central positions to maintain their understandings of the code.
Voices present but missing from this debate. As an advisory fi rm on ethical 
investments, Fair Pensions sits some distance from the centre of the investment 
fi eld. Th eirs were among the few documents from more peripheral actors to 
make any signifi cant statements about behaviour, and its contribution empha-
sizes the primacy of control through regulation, not cohesiveness, collegiality 
and trust. Other non-core actors – whether close intermediates like accountancy 
fi rms or lawyers, or more distant ones like academics or proxy voting agencies – 
also focused on structure and independence, that is, on achieving greater con-
trol, not the contribution of enhanced service. Perhaps they were too removed 
from what goes on inside the “black box” of the boardroom (Huse, 2005; Zona 
& Zattoni, 2007) to feel competent to judge how codes might aff ect behaviour.
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6. Discussion
Th is paper provides several insights concerning corporate governance, the na-
ture of institutional work, and the process of identifi cation. With the exceptions 
of corporate responses the contributions to the debates were largely made by 
organizations. But occasionally named individuals fi led the statements, and 
among the organizational submissions, the corporate governance specialists 
at many companies were individuals well known in the fi eld with strong rep-
utations they developed in part through their continuing involvement in the 
process of codifi cation. 
6.1. Institutional work in corporate governance
Writing the code was in general a conservative process throughout the pe-
riod. Despite crises of legitimacy, these eff orts arose largely outside political 
and legislative purview. As a consequence, the actors engaged in them were 
largely those with vested interests in incumbent practices as much as future 
outcomes. Th ose conditions suggest processes where little institutional change 
would emerge and the work done would be mainly of the “maintaining” varie-
ties in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006).
Work in 1992. Cadbury’s work was institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 
1988), seizing an opportunity when the legitimacy of established practices had 
come into question. Th e process, including the consultations and the informal 
meetings, research and media coverage that surrounded it, provided repeated 
opportunities for the work which Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) call educat-
ing, theorizing, defi ning and vesting. Th e consultation worked by constructing 
normative networks among contributors and between them and the draft ing 
committees and individuals. Th e initial work changed normative associations 
by connecting intended practices with moral underpinnings, which were re-
inforced by the association of the Cadbury family over generations with prac-
tices we now call social responsibility. Cadbury was the moral face of capital-
ism; Maxwell was the opposite. 
Enlisting important industrialists for the committee and soliciting views 
from others brought potential opponents into a position where they needed to 
articulate their position from within the frame set by Cadbury’s draft  had set. In 
contributing to the debate, opponents construct identities not too far removed 
from the terms the draft  had given; its new mechanisms then facilitate diff u-
sion of the new practices, or at least their translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 
1996) by actors less than thoroughly convinced by the arguments they have 
heard. Th is echoes the projective agency in the version of institutional work in 
Battilana and D’Aunno (2009). But holding open competing views through the 
comply-or-explain regime, the code that emerged allows actors in the fi eld to 
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keep multiple identities following diff erent logics in a kind of suspended ani-
mation as they incorporate the code in their own practice. Th is identity work 
(Creed et al., 2010; Lok, 2010) suggests a need to add another type of practi-
cal-evaluation agency to Battilana and D’Aunno’s phase of creating institutions. 
Work in later versions. Subsequent major versions paint a  more complex 
picture. With a formal code in place, the canvas that Higgs and then the FRC 
used in 2003 was not blank. Existing practices from Cadbury had been insti-
tutionalized over a decade and mythologized, a form of “maintaining” work 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Th rough the iconic status of the code around 
the world, those practices had won over critics from 1992. Contributions to 
the “fatal fl aws only” review in 2003 suggest that many had come to identify 
with Cadbury precepts, including ones they had viewed as radical in 1992. 
Th at is, these organizations and in some cases individuals had learned to adapt 
through translation and bricolage to use the code and still suit their compa-
nies’ circumstances. 
Th ey praised the Higgs Review (2003) and its insights into non-executive 
directors, a form of “valorizing”, but disputed its recommendations, “demoniz-
ing” as alien in their attempt to split the board. Th is is work by these actors that 
Lawrence and Suddaby would call “maintaining” incumbent arrangements but 
it is also disrupting the entrepreneurship in Higgs. Nicholson faced that fury 
with a fudge. He converted Higgs’s recommendation of a defi nition of inde-
pendence involving a six-year tenure into what came to be called the “nine-
year rule” created in the 2003 Combined Code. Th at was work that Battilana 
and D’Aunno (2009) would call “repairing” or a change Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) would see as “enabling” – both of the “maintaining” variety – but main-
taining entrepreneurial ideas, while disrupting existing arrangements. 
In 2010, Sir Christopher Hogg’s changes to the code recognized issues left  un-
treated in the Cadbury and Higgs inquiries, that the boardroom ethos was more 
important than structures or formal defi nitions of independence. Contributions 
to that consultation nonetheless brought up old ideas and issues up for recon-
sideration, ideas that sought again to address questions of structure and defi ni-
tions of independence. Th e institutional work was a repeat of prior attempts by 
some to repair and others to undermine the moral associations of a code that 
had failed to prevent a recurrent wave of governance failings. What emerged, 
however, was advocacy of translation and bricolage, advocacy of deinstitution-
alization through explanations rather than compliance. Th e 2010 code picked 
up and amplifi ed the subtext of the discourse that spoke of the limitations of 
code and the need for a combination of trust and challenge, respect within cri-
tique, that corporate actors and some others had advocated since the earliest 
days, but which previous authors of the code had refl ected only in part. Was 
this work disrupting existing arrangements, maintaining the spirit by repair-
ing the language, or creating something rather diff erent? 
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Actors from diff erent parts of the broader fi eld of corporate governance 
would view these examples of work diff erently. Th ose that start with a logic of 
control as the purpose of boards could fi nd the advocacy from corporations 
and the actions of the author in the 2010 process as disrupting to the central 
purpose corporate governance. Th ose that start from a logic of service, of the 
board as a solution to resource constraints, could see in the 2010 process in-
vention and advocacy of a new set of arrangements that simultaneously un-
dermined incumbent ones. 
Work as contingent on position in the fi eld. Th is discussion suggests that the 
concept of institutional work is contingent on the position of the actors in the 
broader fi eld: work one actor might view as maintaining an institution is one 
that disrupts the diff usion of arrangements that others advocate, a somewhat 
diff erent view from that developed by Creed and colleagues (2010). In their 
case, marginal actors committed to the institutions acted as change agents, 
thus simultaneously maintaining and disrupting it. Here, actors hold diff ering 
interpretations of the key tenets of institution – what constitutes board eff ec-
tiveness – and its logic – control or service – each supported by texts and dis-
courses that permit adherents to hold them in contradiction. Th is is true par-
ticularly for this case, because the fi eld is unsettled. 
6.2. Codifi cation and identity
Th is paper demonstrates the processes of institutional work creating the code 
and then helping it to evolve it over time. Th e initial hostility to provisions in 
Cadbury seen as disrupting the ethos of UK boards was diminished and in 
some cases no longer present later on. Th at is, the institutionalization of the 
code has taken hold as individuals and organizational actors adapted their 
practices, and found ways to sustain the elements of ethos of boards. When the 
subsequent revision aft er the Higgs Review challenged their understandings 
of board ethos, those voices argued for Cadbury but against its extension into 
a more confrontational board, but then lost the argument. By 2010, however, 
the process of codifi cation reopens the debate about ethos and, without rolling 
back the provisions installed through Higgs, urges greater use of explanation 
rather than compliance, acknowledging the fears that corporate governance 
had become oppressive to the way boards work. 
Th rough the process of codifi cation, that is through the institutional work 
of creating, maintaining and occasionally seeking to disrupt the code, con-
tributors’ views moderate. Actors from the investment side voice ideas iden-
tifi ed with corporate economic interests. Similarly, corporate actors come to 
voice sentiments that acknowledge investor interests. Some non-core actors’ 
views also converge, as they identify through the processes of codifi cation and 
institutional work with an emerging logic of corporate governance itself. Th is 
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refl ects what individuals active in the UK corporate governance fi eld have re-
marked anecdotally that individuals identify as corporate governance special-
ists, sometimes more strongly than with the organization and fi eld (corpora-
tions, investor, advisor, agitator) in which they work. 
Conclusions
Th ere are several unanswered questions, two of which warrant brief attention 
here. First are the absent voices. Th e consistency of the respondents masks 
changes that have taken place during the fi rst two decades of the code’s exist-
ence. Th e 2010 consultation process went largely without comment from hedge 
funds, sovereign wealth funds and other foreign investors, suggesting that its 
legitimacy may over time come into question. Second, the respondents are in-
dividuals, oft en writing in a corporate persona. If the fi nding of this study is 
that actors show greater allegiance to the principles of the code than one might 
expect from their organizations, the legitimacy may erode as individuals de-
part from the scene or structural changes occur in the investment supply chain. 
Perhaps corporate governance has a biography, as well as a history.
Th e discussion on boardroom ethos has roots in the experience of indi-
viduals, and not just corporate actors, responding to the issues the consulta-
tions raised. As we have seen, respondents came from a variety of parts of the 
investment supply chain, bringing with them both a range of views roughly 
corresponding to their economic interests and a large degree of shared values 
about the nature of corporate governance and the importance of fi nding bet-
ter ways of making it work. Th e contributions suggest that corporate govern-
ance means more to the individuals than their narrow self-interest of their 
organizations would dictate. In that sense they have developed identities that 
embrace the broader fi eld of corporate governance, not just the organizational 
fi eld in which they sit.
Th e study also leads us to think anew about the processes of institutionali-
zation. Th e early puzzle that confronted institutional scholars was to explain 
why organizations were so oft en the same, and why that sameness persisted de-
spite evolving market conditions and product and process innovation (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). Th e eff ort to institutionalize the work of boards of directors, 
to reach a consensus of how directors should interact and what ethos board-
rooms should thus have, is to deny the individuality of fi rms and their strate-
gic imperative to be diff erent from each other. 
It may be that boards are already abstracted from the day-to-day business 
of managing fi rm-specifi c resources and activities. If so then codifying their 
practices could be an appropriate general principle, and one that might apply 
despite the varying formal institutions of law and regulations that the varieties 
of capitalism approach depicts (Hall & Soskice, 2001). If so, then codes might 
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need to be more, not less fl exible if they are to function under varying types of 
organizations and types of market conditions, as well as varying formal insti-
tutional arrangements. Th at seems to be what the comply-or-explain provision 
of the UK code is trying to do. Th is seems to argue for the notion of greater 
board discretion that is observed in the attempts by practitioners to shape the 
recommendations of what the code says about how directors interact even as 
those actors identify with governance as a vocation and reach a growing con-
sensus about the nature of the task. 
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